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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC 02308-87

1 June 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Charles E. Allen  
National Intelligence Officer for Counterterrorism

SUBJECT: Counterterrorism Warning and Forecast Report

1. The monthly Counterterrorism Warning and Forecast Meeting was held at CIA Headquarters on 22 May 1987. The following warning issues were discussed: Philippines, Threat to Western Interests; Japan, the Japanese Red Army and Chukaku-Ha; Greece, the Terrorist Situation, and Status of Syrian-Abu Nidal Relations.

2. Philippines: DIA led the discussion on the threat to American interests in the Philippines, assessing the danger to the 180,000 US citizens there as medium. Despite recent statements by Communist NPA leaders indicating that they might be contemplating attacks against Americans, DIA sees no evidence that the NPA is prepared to attack US personnel, unless the US becomes more involved directly or indirectly in assisting the Philippine Government to combat the Communist insurgency. American retired General Singlaub, for example, has been mentioned as a potential target of the NPA because of his involvement in private efforts to assist counterinsurgency efforts against the Communists. NPA "sparrow teams" are active in the greater metropolitan Manila area and the NPA has claimed responsibility for a number of recent assassinations. Thus, US personnel could be the inadvertent victims of terrorist attacks directed against the Aquino government. The NPA certainly has the capability to conduct terrorist actions against the US and was involved in several incidents against Americans during the Marcos regime. Americans are also the occasional victims of criminal attacks in the Philippines.

3. A number of factors could change the level of threat against the US: (a) deeper US involvement in combatting the insurgency; (b) base renegotiations; (c) greater involvement in the Philippines by third countries such as Iran and Libya; and (d) a conscious decision by the NPA to seek

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outside assistance for its insurgency. Both Libya and Iran have limited capabilities to influence the situation. Libya continues to fund modestly the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) which has engaged the government in low-level insurgency in the southern Philippines for many years. There have been reports of Iran encouraging Islamic elements in the Philippines to oppose the central government and the American presence. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] there may be [REDACTED] pro-Iranian cells on Cebu and Luzon, but these reports have not been confirmed.

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4. In sum, the NPA has not lifted its ban on anti-US attacks but greater involvement by the US in anti-insurgent efforts could trigger a decision to do so. It may, in fact, be deliberately sending threat signals without a serious intent to conduct anti-American operations. The NPA, however, is a large organization and has significant capability to strike throughout the islands. Meanwhile, it will continue to target selectively Philippine citizens and will endeavor "to legitimize" such targeting through political action.

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6. Japan: CIA briefed on the status of the radical Chukaku-Ha (Middle Core Faction) group, assessing the threat from this group is low. The group has remained resilient, however, despite suffering setbacks in 1986. The group has not targeted US interests but does engage in anti-US rhetoric. In conducting terrorist attacks, it attempts to avoid or minimize human casualties.

7. Chukaku-Ha is now focusing on Okinawa where national games will be held this fall. The likelihood that the Chukaku-Ha will engage in some form of political actions during the games has increased because of plans for the Emperor to attend the games (in September or October). It reportedly is planning to stage rallies and perhaps to fire rockets or incendiary devices in order to "make a political statement." The warheads on the rockets, while not powerful, may contain gunpowder and shrapnel. Chukaku-Ha first used explosives on its rockets in early 1985 when it attacked the US Consulate in Kobe. Because of the large number of Americans on Okinawa, it almost certain that they will come in contact with Chukaku-Ha members.

8. The Japanese National Police Agency (NPA) is concerned about the potential for political violence on Okinawa not only with the Chukaku-Ha but other radical groups planning to converge on the island during the national games. Competition among these radical groups enhances the potential for violence. The NPA intends to increase security at US facilities, even though it judges the likelihood of radical Japanese groups engaging in violence against US personnel as low.

9. Japanese security has made inroads against the Chukaku-Ha and has arrested a number of the group's leaders since September 1986. The arrests

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have hurt Chukaku-Ha's covert arm, although it can continue to conduct some operations. CIA estimates that Chukaku-Ha still has 120-200 members in its covert wing which in turn is supported by several thousand overt members. The group, in CIA's view, has the potential of becoming more of a political force in the future because it is essentially a blue collar movement and not a true terrorist group. If it does become a more viable political force, some of the more militant elements may break way.

10. CIA also briefed on the current status of the Japanese Red Army (JRA). The JRA apparently is now split into two factions

One group is centered in Lebanon's Biqa' Valley. It consists at most of 40 members, although it more likely numbers only 20-25 people. In the Biqa', this JRA faction is engaged in training fighters for the Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). The leader of this faction is a female named Saiko.

11. The second faction of the JRA is believed to consist of only about 12 members, some of whom may be non-Japanese. The faction, for example, is thought to have a German member and perhaps an American one. It has been linked to the bombings of the US and Canadian embassies in Jakarta in 1986. It operates under the name of "Anti-Imperialist International Brigade." Neither its leader nor its exact location is known.

12. The Japanese NPA sees the JRA faction in the Biqa' Valley as isolated and essentially without a place to relocate. Some members, however, are reported to have traveled to Libya. The overall threat posed by the JRA is small, although unconfirmed reports continue to surface that the JRA plans terrorist actions to win the release of four convicted JRA terrorists in Japan, two of whom have received the death penalty. However, some of these individuals have been in prison for ten years, and the JRA has yet to stage an attack in an attempt to free them.

14. Greece: CIA's Counterterrorist Center led the discussion on terrorism in Greece. The CIA officer noted that Greek terrorists have recently intensified their activities. Since late April, seven bombings have occurred in Greece. Five of the attacks were directed against the Greek Government; two were aimed at the United States (the bombing of the bus carrying US servicemen on 24 April and an attack against Union Carbide offices in Athens). The attack against the bus resulted in injuries to 16 US servicemen.

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15. The Revolutionary People's Struggle (ELA), a loosely organized umbrella group under which Greek terrorist organizations operate, is believed responsible for most of these attacks. ELA, for example, claimed responsibility for the attack on Union Carbide. The group tends to concentrate on arson and explosive-type attacks. The deadly 17 November Group, which is linked to the ELA, has taken responsibility for the attack on the bus--its first attack in three years. Still another group called the Anti-Authority Struggle has been formed under the ELA's banner.

16. This recent spate of violent attacks in Greece may have been precipitated by the Prime Minister's recent pronouncements in negotiations concerning US bases. The Prime Minister's leftist rhetoric versus his more moderate policies have irritated radical groups and may have prompted them to conduct the attacks.

17. [redacted] the 17 November Organization. A small, tightly knit group [redacted]

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[redacted] Foreign terrorist groups are also active in Greece, and several are believed to have developed support infrastructures there. These groups may include Hizballah, the Abu Nidal Organization, and the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA). The Greek Government has not moved to restrict the activities of these groups and there is a "hands off" attitude toward them. For example, if Libyan and Palestinian groups there focus on non-Greek targets, there is a tendency on the part of the government to look the other way. The Armenian Popular Movement, the political arm of ASALA, has an office in Athens, and there are reports that ASALA itself has a covert presence there.

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19. Status of Syrian-Abu Nidal Relations: State/INR presented a draft cable on this subject which it intended to send to Damascus, but which it first wished to vet with Community specialists.

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20. [redacted] INR stated that it agrees that serious tensions have arisen between the Syrian Government and the ANO and that

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President Assad is unhappy with ANO's involvement in the Palestinian Camp Wars. Syria, moreover, is attempting to lower its profile in regard to the use of terrorism and to decouple itself from ANO terrorism generally.

21. Nevertheless, INR remains convinced that the strains with ANO and the organization's largely self-initiated drawdown of assets in Syria do not mean that Damascus has ended its support for terrorism. Syria instead is keeping its options open on the use of terrorism. The ANO drawdown, moreover, appears to be a precautionary move in anticipation of a possible crackdown by Syria. It does not want a complete break with Damascus and remains active in the Biqa' Valley.

22. Syria, for its part, also does not want to force a complete break with the ANO. Damascus also has maintained its ties to the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) and recently has offered haven to two organizations with a history of terrorist activity in the Persian Gulf region. In sum, Syria's moves are tactical and temporary; Damascus will especially continue to use terrorism in a regional context. Syria's ability to prevent some of the terrorist groups it supports from conducting attacks outside the region is questionable.

23. CIA/NESA observed that we should not understate what is occurring in Syria. Assad is attempting to curb terrorist attacks in Europe by groups its supports, but it would be unrealistic to expect that he will not support radical Islamic groups in the region. Nor is it Assad's style to expel the ANO or to close the camps in the Biqa'. Instead, he will endeavor to make life uncomfortable for the time being for the ANO and other terrorist groups.

24. CIA/CTC supported INR's view that ANO does not wish to break totally with Syria because the organization recognizes that Syria and eastern Lebanon provide an excellent location for its operations. The ANO, while resisting Syrian pressures, is not only developing stronger capabilities in Lebanon but is moving closer to Libya. CTC expects the ANO to become more active in south Lebanon against the Israeli-backed Southern Lebanese Army and against Israel itself. In addition, the ANO is also working to develop a broader political agenda to compliment its terrorist strategy.

25. Community analysts raised the key question of whether a sea-change was in the offing for the ANO and whether it was taking on a broader political agenda would lead to a splintering of the organization. INR did not see such a development. Instead, it thought the ANO would continue to pursue a two-track strategy: conducting terrorism while resisting pressures from state sponsors to curb its activities and the development of a broader political agenda so it could lay claim to becoming the legitimate organization of the Palestinian people.

26. Community analysts agreed that the ANO was not all that restricted to date, that the organization is a highly survivable and capable group, and that it was not all that isolated.

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## Attendees

Charles E. Allen  
 Charles E. Sparks  
 Philip Kosnett  
 Henry Eide  
 Morgan Langston  
 Michael Morse  
 Pamela Dobson

Suzanne Pond  
 Linnea Raine

Charles L. Allen  
 John Davidson

Jeff Shumaker  
 John Henry  
 Terri Chretien  
 Lee Carrigan

Mark Randol  
 Cecilia Capestany  
 Dan Tompkins  
 Margery Benson  
 George Ryan  
 Michael Patenaude

NIO/CT  
 State DS/TAD  
 State INR/TNA  
 DEA/OIDO  
 Customs/Intelligence  
 FAA  
 AFOSI  
 NSA/G11  
 INR/TNA  
 DOE/DASI  
 NSA  
 Army INSCOM  
 NRC/NMSS  
 NSA/G11  
 Coast Guard  
 NSIC/ATAC  
 ATOIC/Army  
 USAITAC  
 USSS/FIB/TS  
 USSS/FIB/FE  
 USSS/FIB/EU  
 HQDA  
 Army ITAC  
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